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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the threshold effect of the U.S. generic fluid milk and 
cheese advertising programs. A threshold delineates the level of advertising intensity that has to 
be met to generate a specific level of sales effect. Given that promotional organizations face 
budget constraints, it is of particular interest to ascertain if there exists a minimum threshold that 
an advertising campaign has to overcome to yield a non-trivial sales effect. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no study focusing on the threshold effects of generic advertising of 
agricultural products.  
 
The estimation results confirm that, for both fluid milk and cheese advertisings, there exist three 
thresholds which partition the quarterly observations between 1975 and 2004 into four possible 
regimes depending on the level of advertising intensity in each period. The generic fluid milk 
advertising goodwill coefficient is found to be relatively small for the regime with the lowest 
advertising intensity, building up to a higher level as the regime progresses, but eventually drops 
to lower levels as the intensity continues to grow, reflecting the eventual arrival of the 
diminishing returns of advertising. The pattern of initial build up, however, is not detected in the 
cheese equation in which the estimated goodwill parameter starts at a rather large magnitude in 
the first regime, but declines monotonically and drastically in the second and third regimes, only 
to become statistically not different from zero in the fourth regime. 
 
To evaluate the performance of the National Dairy Board (NDB) programs over time, the 
estimated demand equations are used to simulate the effect on sales of a change in the fluid milk 
and cheese advertising expenditure paths, focusing on the first ten years and the second ten years 
of the NDB’s operation since 1984. While an increase in advertising expenditures has the effect 
of increasing sales (holding regime configuration constant), it is found that this scale effect of 
additional advertising may be outweighed by the negative effect of a downward shift in the 
goodwill coefficient arising from regime change. In other words, sales can be made lower as the 
result of increased advertising, a feature not supported by the conventional model of no threshold. 
Indeed, in the cheese case advertising elasticity is found to be negative when evaluated at some 
levels larger than the historical pattern. Compared to the result pertaining to the first ten years, 
the benefit-cost ratio of the fluid milk program suggests that the NDB has moved its fluid milk 
operation scale closer to optimal during the second ten years. The optimal fluid milk advertising 
expenditure level for the second ten years is found to be between 105 and 110 percent of the 
historical level.  
 
This paper will contribute to the discussion among researchers, program managers, and industry 
participants on the importance of entertaining the threshold effect of advertising when examining 
program effectiveness and the optimal allocation of program dollars. Researchers need to be 
aware of the potential pitfalls of their conventional econometric estimates (and, hence, the 
limitations of their policy suggestions) when the true model is of threshold type. Program 
managers have argued that advertising effectiveness may vary, depending on the intensity of their 
campaigns and have long sought this information in their spending allocation decisions. The 
insights provided in this paper will enhance our understanding of the threshold effect of 
advertising.   1 
Estimating Threshold Effects of Generic Fluid Milk and Cheese Advertising 
Kenji Adachi and Donald J. Liu 
 
With the proliferation of commodity checkoff programs and the resulting intensification of 
generic advertising and promotion activities, a significant amount of resources and effort have 
been devoted to measuring the economic impacts of these programs. For example, many studies 
have aimed at isolating the causal relationship between advertising expenditures and sales of the 
commodity in question. The estimated advertising-sales relationship is then used for program 
evaluation and management purposes. To ensure that the estimation is unbiased and possesses as 
many other desirable statistical properties as possible, great effort has been exerted to: 1) include 
all other important explanatory variables, 2) evaluate alternative functional relationships between 
advertising and sales, and 3) experiment with different ways of accounting for advertising delay 
and carryover effects over time. 
     In addition to the econometric issues listed above, recent authors have attempted to refine 
the estimate by questioning the appropriateness of treating advertising parameters as constant 
over time. For example, Ward and Dixon (1989) in their fluid milk study argue that the effect of 
advertising on sales can be affected by changes in the underlying structure of the industry such as 
the inception of the National Dairy Board (NDB) and specify advertising parameters as a 
function of some exogenously determined structural dummy variables. Chung and Kaiser (2000), 
and Schmit and Kaiser (2004) treat advertising parameters as a function of changes in such 
variables as advertising theme, competing product advertising, and prices, arguing that a 
time-varying parameter model may provide a more accurate estimate of advertising effectiveness 
because consumers’ response to advertising varies as tastes and demographics evolve along the   2 
time continuum. In a similar vein, Kinnucan and Venkateswaran (1993) specify advertising 
parameters as a function of a time trend.  
     A second area of pursuit in parameter non-constancy has to do with the asymmetry in 
advertising effectiveness. Arguing that consumers do not necessarily respond at the same pace to 
an increase in advertising relative to a decrease in advertising, Vande Kamp and Kaiser (1999) 
segment an advertising goodwill variable into increasing and decreasing parts and include them 
as explanatory variables in their fluid milk sales equation. While the method of segmenting the 
advertising variable, ex post, may not be satisfactory econometrically, the notion that the sales 
effect of advertising depends, in part, on whether the advertising campaign is in an expansion or 
contraction phase is intuitive.
1 
     Allowing for threshold effects, this study focuses on a third area of non-constancy in 
advertising parameter. A threshold delineates the level of advertising intensity (as measured, for 
example, by expenditure level) that has to be met to generate a specific level of sales effect. 
Given that promotional organizations face budget constraints, it is of particular interest to 
ascertain if there exists a minimum threshold that an advertising campaign has to overcome to 
yield a non-trivial sales effect. While rarely investigated within an appropriate estimation 
framework, the notion of advertising threshold is not new in the literature. For example, 
behavioral psychologists have argued that sales response to advertising may exhibit a threshold 
effect because repetitions are often needed to ingrain a stimulus in the consumer’s mind before a 
purchase decision is made (Greenberg and Suttoni, 1973). Corkindale and Newall (1978) find in 
their survey of 22 corporations that a majority of the respondents believe that advertising 
thresholds exist in their market environments for the reason just cited. In a study of 97 consumer 
                                                 
1 Vande Kamp and Kaiser owe their notion of advertising asymmetry to Farrell (1952) who 
estimated demand irreversibility for various consumer products.   3 
goods, Lambin (1976) notices that smaller brands tend to have significantly higher advertising 
shares than their market shares when compared with larger brands, suggesting that there may be 
a threshold in reaching a certain level of communication effectiveness. Using a switching-regime 
model, Vakratsas et al. (2004) address the issue of advertising threshold for two product 
categories: liquid laundry detergent, a frequently purchased product in a relatively stable, mature 
market; and the Sports Utility Vehicles (SUV) and passenger minivans, which are referred to as 
products in newly developed, competitive markets. The authors find advertising threshold effects 
in the SUV and minivans markets, but do not detect the same effect in the liquid laundry 
detergent market. For other frequently purchased products such as frozen entrées, however, Dubé, 
Hitsch, and Manchanda (2005) find evidence of advertising thresholds using a logit-type demand 
specification.  
     To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined the threshold nature of generic 
advertising of agricultural products. Using a bona-fide threshold estimation procedure, this 
article investigates the effect of U.S. generic fluid milk and cheese advertising programs 
employing quarterly data spanning over a period of 30 years. The hypothesis is that 
advertising-sales relationship may vary across regimes, depending on the intensity of advertising 
efforts. For example, one might postulate that advertising has no effect on sales in the low 
expenditure regime in which a minimum threshold is yet to be reached, has only a modest effect 
in the medium expenditure regime, and has a large effect in the high expenditure regime, with the 
possibility of a fourth regime reflecting the eventual diminishing returns of advertising. Hansen’s 
(1996, 1999, 2000) threshold estimation procedure is used to estimate the threshold parameters 
and test for the existence of the threshold effect. 
   4 
     The organization of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents a conceptual model that 
allows for threshold effects in the advertising-sales relationship. Section 3 discusses the 
empirical specification and the data, followed by the estimation results in Section 4. Based on the 
estimated models, simulations are conducted in Section 5 to investigate the effectiveness of 
generic fluid milk and cheese advertising programs during the first and second ten years of the 
NDB which was charged to oversee the operation of the U.S. milk promotion programs since its 
inception in 1984. A summary and conclusions can be found in Section 6. 
 
Threshold Sales Response Equation 
For illustration purposes, consider the following demand equation depicting a conventional 
advertising-sales relationship for the product in question (fluid milk or cheese): 
(1)  , t t y e + ¢ = β xt  
where t y   and t x , respectively, are the retail demand quantity and a vector of demand 
determinants (or their nonlinear transformations) at time t,  βis the associated vector of 
regression parameters and t e   is the error term. The vector of demand determinants includes the 
traditional economic variables such as prices and income, as well as generic and branded 
advertising goodwill variables which are to account for the effect on sales of advertising while 
recognizing that there is usually carryover effect associated with a given campaign (Vande Kamp 
and Kaiser, Chung and Kaiser, Schmit and Kaiser). Specifically, each of the advertising goodwill 
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where t GW   is the advertising goodwill stock (generic or branded) which depends on advertising 
expenditures at t-k, k t AD - , with k = 0, 1, …, m, where m is the number of quarters of advertising 
carryover.
2 The coefficient k w is the weight assigned to k t AD -  and different structures 
for k w will be entertained in the empirical section. 
     To allow for threshold effect, consider the case in which the effect on sales of generic 
goodwill depends on the advertising intensity of the program. Further, for concreteness, consider 
the case in which there are three regimes for advertising intensity: low, medium, and high 
regimes. The advertising-sales relationship in equation (1) can be modified as:  
(3) 
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where t GGW  is the generic goodwill stock (for fluid milk or cheese), t x contains other demand 
determinants,  t I  is the intensity of generic advertising in question, and  L g  and  U g  are the 
lower and upper thresholds partitioning the observations into the three regimes. Equation (3) 
dictates that if the threshold variable, t I , lies between the lower and upper thresholds, the 
medium intensity regime prevails and the generic goodwill parameter takes the value of 
M q . On 
the other hand, if  t I  lies below (above) the lower (upper) threshold, the generic goodwill 
parameter takes the value of 
L q (
H q ). The parameter vector  β for other demand determinants 
is treated as regime independent to focus attention on the threshold effects of generic advertising 
while conserving the degree of freedom. 
                                                 
2 Given that the current study employs quarterly data, the construction of the goodwill variable 
in (2) does not consider the delay effect of advertising. Had a delay of d periods been required, 
the index for the summation sign in (2) would have been from k = d to m.    6 
     If the thresholds,  L g  and  U g , were known, the estimation of equation (3) would be 
straightforward as the observations could then be partitioned into three groups and the usual 
regression procedure would apply. This insight motivates Hansen’s (1999) one-dimensional grid 
search of identifying threshold estimates in a multiple-stage estimation framework. In the first 
stage, one considers only a single threshold and obtains its estimate by minimizing the 
corresponding single-threshold sum of squared errors function. In the second stage, one 
introduces an additional threshold and obtains (again via a one-dimensional grid search) the 
estimate of this second threshold by minimizing the corresponding double-threshold sum of 
squared errors function, holding constant the first threshold estimate. To improve the asymptotic 
efficiency of the first estimate, Hansen (1999) proposes a third-stage estimation in which the first 
threshold is re-estimated via a minimization of the double-threshold sum of squared errors 
function, holding constant the second threshold estimate. While equation (3) entertains only two 
thresholds, Hansen’s (1999) procedure is readily extendable to higher-order threshold models. 
     Using the above-mentioned grid-search procedure, the two thresholds in equation (3) can 
be estimated in conjunction with other model parameters. The distribution theory for threshold 
estimates is provided by Hansen for the case of independent and identically distributed errors 
(1999) and for the case of conditionally heteroscedastic errors (2000). To ascertain the statistical 
relevance of the two-threshold model, vis-à-vis the alternative of a single threshold model and 
that of no threshold, likelihood ratio statistics can be computed in the usual way. However, there 
are complications in testing for thresholds, arising from the fact that a threshold is not identified 
under the null hypothesis that it does not exist. While this dilemma, commonly referred to as the 
unidentified nuisance parameter problem (Andrews and Ploberger, 1994), renders invalid the 
conventional distribution of the test statistic, Hansen (1996) was able to arrive at an asymptotic   7 
distribution free of the nuisance parameter via a conditional transformation of the conventional 
distribution. The author (1996) proposes a bootstrap simulation procedure to approximate the 
requisite conditional transformation.  
 
Empirical Specification 
The variables included in the empirical estimation of the retail fluid milk and cheese demand 
equations are similar to those in Kaiser (2000) and Schmit and Kaiser. The estimations involve 
U.S. data from the first quarter of 1975 (1975.1) through the fourth quarter of 2004 (2004.4). 
Within the threshold regression framework, per capita retail demands are specified as functions 
of own price, substitute prices, income, consumer demographics, consumption trend, consumers’ 
attitudes toward bovine somatotropin (bST), generic and branded advertising goodwill stocks, 
and seasonality. Specifically, in the fluid milk equation the own price is the consumer price index 
for whole milk and the substitute price is the consumer price index for nonalcoholic beverages, 
while in the cheese equation they are the consumer price index for cheese and the consumer price 
index for meats, respectively. The income figures are the per capita disposable personal income 
and the demographic variable is the percentage of the U.S. population under age six. A trend 
variable with 1975.1 being one is used to capture the general consumption trend in fluid milk, 
and a structural dummy variable of 1994.1 – 2004.4 equaling 1 and 0 otherwise is used to 
account for consumer’s health concern toward the adoption of bST in milk production. Table 1 
reports the descriptive statistics and sources of the data used in the study. 
     Equation (2) specifies goodwill as a function of current and lagged advertising 
expenditures which are measured in million dollars and deflated by an appropriate media cost   8 
index (with 2004.1 ~ 2004.4 as the base periods).
3 Within the conventional regression 
framework, previous authors (e.g., Cox 1992, Vande Kamp & Kaiser) have specified different 
functional forms (e.g., geometric polynomial and exponential functions) for the lag weights k w in 
(2) and estimated them simultaneously with the regression parameters in (1). Estimating equation 
(2) simultaneously with the threshold equation (3), however, would complicate the estimation 
procedure in Hansen (1999) and may invalidate the asymptotic theory therein. Instead, the lag 
weights for advertising expenditures are specified exogenously and, upon entertaining ten 
different weighing schemes, are chosen as 1.0 for the current quarter expenditures and 0.55, 0.3 
and 0.15 for the lagged expenditures of the immediate past three quarters.
4  
     Turn to the threshold equation in (3) and note the following empirical details. First, the 
equation has generic advertising intensity, It, as the threshold variable which is to compare 
against the threshold parameters, g ’s, for separating the sample into different regimes. Generic 
fluid milk and cheese advertising expenditures (deflated by their respective media cost indices) 
are used as proxies for advertising intensity in the fluid milk and cheese equations, respectively.
5 
                                                 
3 Different media cost indices are used to deflate fluid milk and cheese advertising expenditures. 
This is because the two advertising programs have historically used different mixes of medium 
which have different rates of inflation. 
 
4 The ten weighing schemes used in the construction of the goodwill variables can be 
categorized into two groups: 1) monotonically declining weighing schemes with a lag length of 
three or five quarters, and 2) hump-shaped (peaking at various lags) weighing schemes with a lag 
length of three or five quarters. Within each of the two groups, the choice of the weights does not 
affect in any significant way the magnitudes of the regression and threshold coefficients. The 
monotonically declining weighing scheme is chosen over the hump-shaped alternative because 
the former gives rise to tighter confidence intervals for the coefficients. Holding other aspects of 
the weighing specification constant, the estimation results from a three-lag model are essentially 
identical to those from a five-lag model. The three-lag model is chosen for parsimonious reasons. 
 
5 An alternative candidate for the threshold variable is the generic goodwill stock which is 
constructed as a linear function of current and lagged advertising expenditures. This specification 
is dismissed because it yields wrong signs of some of the regression coefficients.    9 
Second, the income and own price variables in the fluid milk equation are deflated by the 
consumer price index for nonalcoholic beverages, an approach in line with the specification in 
Kaiser who argues that there exist strong correlations between substitute price and own price for 
dairy products.
6 Third, the income and own price variables in the cheese equation are deflated 
by the consumer price index for meats, treating as the substitute price.
7 Fourth, the equations are 




The estimation results are reported in this section, with the first subsection focusing on the 
threshold parameter estimates and the second subsection on the regression coefficients as well as 
the elasticity measures.   
 
Test for Threshold Effects and Threshold Parameter Estimates 
The existence of advertising threshold is investigated by a sequence of likelihood ratio tests of 
comparing alternative models. One starts with the null hypothesis of no threshold vs. the 
alternative hypothesis of one threshold, and progresses sequentially to the null hypothesis of T 
                                                 
6 Alternative specifications of including own price, income and substitute prices as separate 
explanatory variables, while deflating each of them by the consumer price index for all items, 
resulted in much wider confidence intervals for the estimated threshold parameters and for some 
of the regression coefficients. 
 
7 Similar estimation results are obtained under the alternative specification of including 
consumer price index for fats and oils as the substitute price. This is consistent with Schmit and 
Kaiser’s finding that the choice between meats price and fats and oils price is inconsequential to 
the estimation results. In the current model of threshold regression, however, it is found that the 
confidence intervals for the threshold estimates are not as tight when using fats and oils price as 
the deflator.   10 
thresholds vs. the alternative hypothesis of T+1 thresholds as warranted by the test result. Table 2 
reports the likelihood ratio statistics, along with Hansen’s 1996 bootstrapped critical values for 
the sequential tests.  
     In the case of fluid milk demand equation, the null hypothesis of the conventional model 
of no advertising threshold is soundly rejected at one percent significant level in favor of the 
alternative of one threshold. A same level of rejection is achieved when comparing the null 
hypothesis of one threshold with the alternative of two thresholds. However, the test result of 
entertaining the possibility of a third threshold is not as unambiguous; one can reject the 
two-threshold null in favor of the three-threshold alternative only at a significant level slightly 
above five percent (p-value is six percent). Finally, the result of testing for the existence of a 
fourth threshold leads one to conclude that there are at most three advertising thresholds in the 
fluid milk equation.   
     That there exist three thresholds for generic advertising is similarly confirmed in the 
cheese equation. The null hypothesis of no threshold (vs. the alternative of one threshold) can be 
rejected at one percent significant level. The null hypothesis of one threshold (vs. the alternative 
of two thresholds) can be rejected at ten percent significant level (p-value is eight percent), and 
the null hypothesis of two thresholds (vs. the alternative of three thresholds) can be rejected at 
five percent significant level (p-value is two percent). The final test of entertaining a fourth 
threshold fails to reject the null of only three thresholds at conventional significant levels.  
     The estimates of the three thresholds and their 95% asymptotic confidence intervals are 
reported in table 3. For the fluid milk case, the threshold estimates are 14.39, 18.98, and 39.50, 
with the associated confidence intervals non-overlapping, suggesting that the estimates are 
distinct statistically. The threshold estimates indicate that if the generic fluid milk advertising   11 
expenditures (measured in 2004 media dollars) should fall below $14 million the first regime 
would prevail, between $14 and $19 million the second regime would prevail, between $19 and 
$40 million the third regime would prevail, and above $40 million the fourth regime would 
prevail. To place the above threshold estimates within a historical context of the observed data, 
note that the first and second thresholds lie below the median of the deflated generic fluid milk 
advertising expenditures ($20 million) and the third threshold is above the 75 percentile of the 
data range ($30 million). Notice also that, out of a total of 120 observations, 22 quarters fall into 
the first regime, 29 quarters the second regime, 54 quarters the third regime and 15 quarters the 
fourth regime. Figure 1 illustrates the above mentioned sample separation into various regimes of 
the historical data. The observations before the inception of the NDB fall mainly in the first (R1) 
and second (R2) regimes, whereas observations during the first ten years of the NDB fall mainly 
in the second (R2) and third (R3) regimes and those during the second ten years of the NDB 
mainly in the third (R3) and fourth (R4) regimes. The findings in table 3 and figure 1 
unequivocally demonstrate the importance of allowing for regime separations in the estimation 
of the sales response of generic fluid milk advertising. 
     As to the generic cheese advertising in table 3, the threshold estimates are $0.82 million, 
$2.46 million, and $23.07 million (measured in 2004 media dollars), with the confidence 
intervals non-overlapping. In comparing with the data, the first and second thresholds lie below 
the 25 percentile ($6 million) of the observations while the third threshold is above the 75 
percentile ($17 million), suggesting the third regime is the dominating regime which accounts for 
50 percent of the data range. Out of a total of 120 observations, 13 quarters fall into the first 
regime, 11 quarters the second regime, 87 quarters the third regime and 9 quarters the fourth 
regime. Figure 2 shows that, with the exception of the period from 1984 to 1987 which belongs   12 
to the fourth regime of unusually high expenditures (over $23 million), the third regime ($3 ~ 
$23 million) has predominated since the beginning of the 1980s, prior to which the observations 
mainly fall into the low expenditure category of the first (below $0.8 million) and second ($0.8 ~ 
$3 million) regimes. Again, the estimation results confirm the importance of allowing for regime 
separations in assessing the sales effectiveness of generic cheese advertising. 
 
Regression Parameter Estimates and Elasticities 
The estimation results pertaining to the empirical counterpart of equation (3) are reported in table 
4. Unless noted otherwise, all the coefficients are significant at, at least, 95 percent confidence 
level. Focus first on the regime dependent parameter: generic goodwill. The estimation results 
reveal how the generic goodwill stock affects demand under alternative regimes. In the fluid milk 
equation, the largest coefficient is the one pertaining to the second regime (0.089), with those for 
the first (0.068) and third (0.065) regime being about equal in magnitude and the one for the 
fourth regime (0.048) the smallest. This result is interesting because it suggests a requirement of 
an initial build up of the generic goodwill via boosting advertising intensity to reach a certain 
level of sales effect, but the effect diminishes as the goodwill stock continues to grow. The 
pattern of initial build up, however, is not detected in the cheese equation in which the estimated 
goodwill parameter starts at a rather large magnitude of 2.589 in the first regime, but declines 
monotonically and drastically in the second (1.247) and third (0.057) regimes, and eventually 
becomes statistically not different from zero in the fourth regime. Lacking of a build up phase 
notwithstanding, the cheese result still supports the notion of diminishing returns of advertising 
and, indeed, it has zero effect when the intensity is so high that the fourth regime prevails. 
   13 
     Turn to other regression coefficients in table 4 which are specified as regime invariable. 
The own price coefficients have the expected negative sign in both equations, but the one in the 
cheese equation is significant only at the ten percent level. Both income coefficients are positive 
and highly significant. The branded cheese goodwill variable has a positive coefficient in the 
cheese equation, but the branded fluid milk goodwill variable is deleted from the fluid milk 
equation as its coefficient (positive aside) is not statistically different from zero at the usual 
confidence levels. The estimation results from the fluid milk equation also confirm previous 
findings of a positive correlation between fluid milk consumption and percentage of population 
under age six, and a negative correlation between fluid milk consumption and the adoption of 
bST (Kaiser, Schmit and Kaiser).
8 The history patterns of a downward trend in fluid milk 
consumption and an upward movement in cheese consumption are reflected in the signs of the 
trend coefficients in the two equations. All the quarter dummy variables are highly significant, 
indicating a strong seasonal pattern in the consumption of dairy products. To address the problem 
of autocorrelation in the initial equations (not reported), a first-order autoregressive [AR(1)] term 
for the residuals is included in the fluid milk equation and both the first-and second-order 
[AR(2)] autoregressive error terms are included in the cheese equation.
9 The Breusch-Godfrey 
statistic indicates that the residuals in both fluid milk and cheese equations are free from 
                                                 
8 Following Kaiser and Schmit and Kaiser, the age variable and the bST dummy variable are 
excluded from the cheese demand equation. The finding that there exist threshold effects in 
generic cheese advertising reported in the previous subsection remains valid when the age and 
bST variables are also included in the cheese question, albeit only two thresholds were identified 
by the likelihood ratio tests. With the inclusion of those two variables, the coefficients for the 
own price and branded cheese goodwill variables became insignificant (and the bST coefficient 
was also insignificant). 
 
9 The autoregressive parameters are estimated with other regression parameters, holding 
constant the threshold coefficients. The imposition of the autoregressive error terms does not 
change the estimated regression coefficients and their t-ratios in any significant manner.    14 
autocorrelations. Finally, the adjusted R-squared is 0.96 for fluid milk and 0.99 for cheese, 
indicating good fit of the data. 
     To facilitate comparison between the estimated parameters in table 4 with those obtained 
by recent authors using national data, table 5 reports elasticities of key variables, evaluated at the 
sample means, along with their standard errors. The generic goodwill stock elasticities 
(henceforth goodwill elasticities) for fluid milk are regime dependent, ranging from 0.04 for the 
fourth regime to 0.08 for the second regime. Those elasticity measures fall within the range of 
previous estimates [e.g., 0.04 in Schmit and Kaiser, 0.05 in Kaiser, and 0.06 in Blisard et al. 
(1999)]. As to the cheese case, the estimated goodwill elasticities for the third and fourth regimes 
are within the range of previous results of 0.01 ~ 0.02 (Schmit and Kaiser; Kaiser; and Blisard et 
al.), while the elasticity for the first and second regimes are estimated to be much larger.  
     Regarding the own-price elasticity in table 5, the current estimate of -0.2 for fluid milk is 
in consonance with those found in Kaiser (-0.17) and Blisard et al. (-0.12), but is much larger in 
magnitude than the one reported in Schmit and Kaiser (-0.04). The estimated own-price elasticity 
of cheese is -0.15 which is smaller in absolute value than those reported in previous studies not 
recognizing the threshold effect of advertising (e.g., -0.32 in Kaiser, -0.35 in Schmit and Kaiser, 
and -0.62 in Blisard et al.). The comparison of the income elasticity of fluid milk demand is 
mixed, with the current estimate (0.45) being similar to the one reported in Schmit and Kaiser 
(0.42), but larger than those in Kaiser and Blisard et al. (0.18 and 0.21, respectively). The income 
elasticity for cheese is 0.2, which is similar to those reported in Blisard et al. (0.24) and Kaiser 
(0.31), but smaller than the 0.66 estimate reported in Schmit and Kaiser. As to the branded 
goodwill elasticity for cheese advertising, the current estimate of 0.03 is identical to that in 
Kaiser. Finally, the age elasticity for fluid milk indicates that as the percentage of population   15 
under age six increases by one percent [e.g., from its mean figure of 7.3% to (7.3 *1.01) % ], the 
per capita consumption of fluid milk would increase by 0.2%, a figure much smaller than those 
reported in Kaiser (0.6) and Schmit and Kaiser (0.8). 
 
Simulation 
The estimated fluid milk and cheese demand equations are used to simulate the effect on sales of 
changes in advertising expenditures, allowing for different regimes to manifest as the 
consequence of the expenditure change. The resulting advertising expenditure elasticity 
(henceforth advertising elasticity) differs from the goodwill elasticities in table 5 because the 
simulation here is with respect to a change in advertising expenditure flow, rather than in 
advertising goodwill stock. More importantly, the goodwill elasticities in table 5 pertain to 
individual regimes, while the simulated advertising elasticities in this section mimic the reality 
(of the model) by allowing regime to shift as the consequence of a change in advertising intensity. 
In the case of fluid milk, the simulation results are also used to obtain insights toward the 
optimality of the advertising program as the benefit of additional fluid milk sales due to an 
increased advertising can be easily evaluated using information on Class I differential. 
     In addition to the baseline simulation of historical spending pattern, advertising 
expenditures are set at a five percent increment of the historical level, up to a total of 100 percent 
increment, to gain insights into what would have been the sales effect had the NDB set its 
advertising expenditures at a higher level. To focus the analysis on the performance over time of 
the programs, the simulations are conducted for two periods: the first ten years (1984.4 – 1994.4) 
and the second ten years (1995.1 – 2004.4) of the NDB’s operation. 
   16 
     The simulation results for fluid milk sales are reported in figure 3 in which advertising 
elasticities for each of the two simulation periods are computed at various hypothetical 
expenditure levels.
10 Focus on the first pair of the bars appearing in the far left of the figure. 
Comparing the sales associated with 105 percent of the historical advertising expenditure level 
with the sales from the historical level gives an estimate of the historical fluid milk advertising 
elasticity of 0.052 for the first ten years of the simulation and 0.072 for the second ten years.
11 
The difference in the sales effects is, in part, due to the fact that the magnitude of a fixed 
percentage shock is different for the two periods, given that the deflated advertising expenditures 
are much higher in the second period ($33 million per quarter) than in the first period ($23 
million per quarter). In addition to the above scale effect on sales of the shock, there is a 
regime-shift effect also contributing to the higher advertising elasticity for the second period. 
This can be better understood by inspecting figure 1 and noting that the five percent increment in 
the expenditures in the first period had resulted in more observations being shifted from the third 
regime to the fourth regime, with the latter having a smaller goodwill coefficient (and, hence, a 
smaller sales effect, ceteris paribus).
12 The downward shift in the goodwill coefficient arising 
from regime change also underlies the diminishing returns property of the model, vividly 
illustrated in figure 3. Specifically, for each of the two simulation periods, the computed 
                                                 
10 For conciseness, the simulation results are reported only up to 20 percent increment of the 
historical advertising expenditures.  
 
11 The elasticity is arc, computed as the ratio of the percentage change in sales (from the base 
quantity) and the percentage change in advertising expenditures (from the base expenditures). 
 
12 Given the magnitude of the shock, note that there are two factors which determine the number 
of observations being shifted from regime 3 to regime 4 in each simulation period: the number of 
observations residing in the lower regime before the shock (i.e., the number of the candidates), 
and how close those observations are to the threshold bordering the two regimes (i.e., the 
qualification of the candidates).   17 
advertising elasticity declines gradually from 0.052 to 0.029 for the first ten year period and from 
0.072 to 0.025 for the second ten year period as an additional five percent of the historical 
spending level is being added to the base expenditures.  
     The simulation results pertaining to cheese sales are reported in figure 4. Again focus on 
the first pair of the bars evaluating the sales effects in the two simulation periods of a five 
percent increase in cheese advertising expenditures from the historical level. As in the fluid milk 
case, the cheese advertising elasticity for the first ten years is found to be smaller than that for 
the second ten years (0.016 and 0.026, respectively), owing mainly to the fact that the increased 
cheese advertising expenditures has resulted in more observations in the first simulation period 
being shifted from the higher coefficient regime (R3) to the lower coefficient regime (R4) than in 
the second period.
13 The effect on sales of a downward shift in the goodwill coefficient arising 
from regime change is most dramatically demonstrated in figure 4 when comparing advertising 
elasticities under different expenditure levels. Specifically, unlike the conventional model of no 
threshold, it is possible here for sales to be made lower as the consequence of an increase in 
advertising expenditures if the effect of the resulting downward shift in goodwill coefficient 
outweighs the scale effect of the increased advertising. Thus, figure 4 suggests that it was correct 
for the NDB not engaging in cheese advertising in the first simulation period beyond the level it 
had expended, as otherwise the marginal returns on sales would have been negative. As to the 
second simulation period in figure 4, the negative marginal returns of advertising would kick in 
only after the expenditures are increased to about 120 percent of the historical level. It is 
                                                 
13 As in the fluid milk case, the sales effect of a fixed percentage shock of the historical 
expenditures depends also on the magnitude of the historical expenditures. The deflated cheese 
advertising expenditures are in general higher in the first ten years than in the second ten years 
($18 and $14 million per quarter, respectively), suggesting a larger sales impact for the first 
period (holding regime configuration constant). However, this scale effect was dominated by the 
regime shift effect just discussed.   18 
interesting to note that the historical cheese expenditures for the second period were about 20 
percent lower than that for the first period (see footnote 13).  
     Note that the discussion in the preceding paragraph does not involve the issue of 
optimality as it refers only to the sales effect of cheese advertising without making reference to 
the monetary costs and benefits of the advertising program. The optimality issue is difficult to 
tackle because the benefit to dairy farmers of additional cheese sales depends on a number of 
factors. If the government support price for cheese is binding, the additional cheese sales due to 
advertising would have the effect of reducing government purchase of the surplus cheese without 
affecting the price dairy farmers receive. On the other hand, if the market equilibrium prevails 
and the support price is not binding, the Class II price that dairy farmers receive would be 
endogenous, affected by the advertising-induced cheese sales.
14 Thus, a complete analysis would 
entail a dairy industry model in the line of Liu et al. (1991) which allows for the market to switch 
between a market equilibrium regime and a government supported regime, depending on supply 
and demand conditions. Given the aim of the current study which focuses on the threshold effect 
of advertising, the development of a switching industry model with an embedded feature of 
advertising threshold is best left for future research.   
     In the case of fluid milk advertising, however, the optimality analysis is much more 
straightforward. An advertising-induced fluid milk sales reallocates milk from Class II to Class I 
usage and thus the benefits to dairy farmers can be evaluated at Class I differential (i.e., the 
difference between Class I and Class II prices). Compared to the case of no generic fluid milk 
adverting, the benefits and costs of the program are computed for the two simulation periods. 
                                                 
14 Under the stipulation of the Federal Milk Marketing Order, milk used in fluid products is 
placed in Class I, the highest priced class, while milk used to produce cheese, ice cream, yogurt, 
butter, nonfat dry milk, and other manufactured products is placed in Class II, or other 
lower-priced classes (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service, 2006).   19 
The benefit-cost ratios are also computed for various increments of advertising expenditures 
from the historical level to gain insights toward the effectiveness of the NDB’s fluid milk 
operation.  
     Focus on the benefit-cost ratios for the first simulation period in figure 5. Compared to the 
case of no advertising, the benefit-cost ratio of the fluid milk advertising program for the first 
period is 1.8, suggesting that the benefit of the program outweighs its costs and the net benefit to 
dairy farmers could have been made higher had the expenditures been set at a higher level. Had 
the advertising expenditures been increased to 120 percent (and beyond) for the first simulation 
period, the computed benefit-cost ratio would have dropped, approaching 1.2. As to the second 
simulation period, the benefit-cost ratio is 1.2 for the historical spending level, suggesting that 
the NDB has moved its fluid milk operation scale closer to optimal after being in existence for 
ten years. Indeed, the simulation results suggest that the optimal fluid milk advertising 
expenditure level for the second ten years is between 105 and 110 percent of the historical level, 
as beyond which point the benefit-cost ratio would fall below one. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
While the threshold modeling approach is merely a way of introducing nonlinearity between 
sales and advertising, it allows researchers to capture the fact that repetitions in messages are 
often needed before a purchase decision is made – as Simon and Arndt (1980, p.13) aptly put it, 
“you’ve got to keep dripping the water onto the rock until it cracks.” From a practical viewpoint 
of program managers, the threshold approach is also useful as it provides unique insights toward 
the various ranges of advertising operation scale within each of which the marginal effect on 
sales of advertising remains more or less constant. Using a bona-fide threshold estimation   20 
procedure, this study represents the first attempt to investigate if thresholds exist in the sales 
effect of U.S. generic fluid milk and cheese advertising programs.  
     The estimation results of the sales response equations confirm that, for both fluid milk and 
cheese advertisings, there exist three thresholds which partition the 30-year quarterly 
observations in the data into four possible regimes depending on the level of advertising intensity 
in each period. The generic fluid milk advertising goodwill coefficient is found to be relatively 
small for the regime with the lowest advertising intensity, building up to a higher level as the 
regime progresses, but eventually drops to lower levels as the intensity continues to grow, 
reflecting the eventual arrival of the diminishing returns of advertising. The pattern of initial 
build up, however, is not detected in the cheese equation in which the estimated goodwill 
parameter starts at a rather large magnitude in the first regime, but declines monotonically and 
drastically in the second and third regimes, only to become statistically not different from zero in 
the fourth regime. 
     To evaluate the performance of the national programs over time, the estimated equations 
are used to simulate the effect on sales of a change in the advertising expenditure path, focusing 
on the first ten years and the second ten years of the NDB’s operation since 1984. While an 
increase in advertising expenditures has the effect of increasing sales (holding regime 
configuration constant), it is found that this scale effect of additional advertising may be 
outweighed by the negative effect of a downward shift in the goodwill coefficient arising from 
regime change. In other words, sales can be made lower as the result of increased advertising, a 
feature not characteristic of the conventional model of no threshold. Indeed, in the cheese case 
advertising elasticity is found to be negative when evaluated at some levels larger than the 
historical pattern. The results also show that there has been an increase in both fluid milk and   21 
cheese advertising elasticities over the two simulation periods.   
     In the case of fluid milk advertising, the benefit of additional sales due to advertising is 
evaluated at Class I differential. The benefit-cost ratio of the fluid milk program during the first 
ten years of the NDB’s operation is found to be 1.8, with the ratio approaching 1.2 as the 
historical expenditure level is being expanded. With the observed fluid milk advertising 
expenditures greatly increased during the second ten years, the benefit-cost ratio becomes 1.2 for 
the historical level, suggesting that the NDB has moved its fluid milk operation scale closer to 
optimal. Indeed, the simulation results suggest that the optimal fluid milk advertising expenditure 
level for the second ten years is between 105 and 110 percent of the historical level. 
     The optimality issue pertaining to cheese advertising is more difficult to tackle because of 
the complications of the market system, burdened by the classified milk pricing scheme and the 
dairy price support program. While it is not straightforward to cast the advertising threshold 
models of this study onto a switching dairy industry model which allows for the realization of 
either a market equilibrium regime or a government supported regime, this line of future research 
may prove to be fruitful in helping researchers gain a deeper understanding of the threshold 
effect of generic dairy product advertising and its impacts on the various components of the 
industry. 
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Table 1. Statistical Summary of Variables 
a 
Variable  Units  Mean  Std. Dev.  Data Source 
Retail fluid milk demand per capita  lbs. MFE  53.27  3.70  USDA/ERS 
Retail cheese demand per capita  lbs. MFE  48.48  11.12  USDA/ERS 
CPI for fresh milk and cream   1982-84=100  119.36  30.91  USDL/BLS 
CPI for cheese  1982-84=100  121.04  34.73  USDL/BLS 
CPI for nonalcoholic beverages  1982-84=100  109.70  25.57  USDL/BLS 
CPI for meats  1982-84=100  121.38  32.02  USDL/BLS 
Per capita disposable personal income  Thousand $  16.34  7.14  Economagic, LLC 
Percentage of the population under age six  %  7.26  0.28  Economagic, LLC 
Generic fluid milk advertising expenditures  mil $.  14.00  11.00  NICPRE 
Generic cheese advertising expenditures  mil $.  7.20  5.22  NICPRE 
Branded fluid milk advertising expenditures  mil $.  2.31  1.88  NICPRE 
Branded cheese advertising expenditures  mil $.  17.33  8.12  NICPRE 
Media cost index for fluid milk  2004=100  2.38  1.24  NICPRE 
Media cost index for cheese  2004=100  2.40  1.17  NICPRE 
a Retail fluid milk and cheese demands per capita are expressed in milkfat equivalent (MFE) basis, CPI denotes consumer price index, 
USDA/ERS stands for U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, and USDL/BLS stands for U.S. Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data on advertising expenditures and media cost indices are provided by the National Institute 
for Commodity Promotion Research and Evaluation (NICPRE). 
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Table 2. Tests Results for Threshold Effects 







1%  5%  10% 
Fluid Milk:           
No Threshold  One Threshold  22.7  14.5  10.9   9.4 
One Threshold  Two Thresholds  19.6  15.3  11.3   9.5 
Two Thresholds  Three Thresholds  11.7  18.1  12.6  10.2 
Three Thresholds Four Thresholds   3.7  17.8  13.4  11.3 
Cheese:           
No Threshold  One Threshold  17.5  15.5  11.4  10.1 
One Threshold  Two Thresholds   9.7  14.0  10.8   9.4 
Two Thresholds  Three Thresholds  13.4  14.3  10.6   9.1 
Three Thresholds Four Thresholds   5.2  14.6  10.2   8.9 
a 1,000 replications were conducted in each bootstrap run. 
 
Table 3. Threshold Estimates 








First threshold  14.39  13.82 ~ 15.15    0.82  0.56 ~ 0.92 
Second threshold  18.98  18.06 ~ 20.75    2.46  2.05 ~ 9.50 
Third threshold  39.50  33.83 ~ 42.25    23.07  21.09 ~ 24.35 
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Table 4. Estimated Regression Parameters: Triple-Threshold Model 
  Fluid milk    Cheese 
Variables   Coefficient  t-ratio    Coefficient  t-ratio 
Regime dependent parameter          
Generic goodwill 
a          
Regime 1  0.068  4.4    2.589  5.1 
Regime 2  0.089  8.2    1.217  4.0 
Regime 3  0.065  8.2    0.056  2.9 
Regime 4  0.048  8.6    0.016  1.0 
Regime independent parameters          
Intercept  43.999  14.2    27.997   7.6 
Normalized own price 
b  –9.998  –6.0    –7.218   –1.8 
Normalized income 
b   1.685   8.0     0.792   2.7 
Branded goodwill 
a   n.a. 
e  n.a.     0.022   3.1 
Percentage under age six   1.429    3.7    n.a.  n.a. 
bST dummy 
c  –0.920   –2.2    n.a.  n.a. 
Time trend  –0.252  –11.2     0.272   13.5 
Quarter dummy 1  –0.629   –3.2    –4.595  –14.2 
Quarter dummy 2  –3.203  –16.2    –2.456   –7.8 
Quarter dummy 3  –2.769  –13.9    –2.419   –7.7 
AR(1)   0.542    5.7     0.329    3.5 
AR(2)  n.a.  n.a.     0.293    3.0 
Adjusted R-square  0.96    0.99 
First-order Breusch-Godfrey Test
d  0.20 (3.84)    2.06 (3.84) 
a Generic (branded) goodwill variables are specified as the weighted sum of current and previous 
three quarters’ generic (branded) expenditures deflated by a media cost index. 
 
b Own prices and per capita disposable income in the fluid milk and cheese equations are 
normalized by a substitute price (CPI for nonalcoholic beverages in the fluid milk equation and 
CPI for meats in the cheese equation). 
c The
 bST dummy equals one from 1994.1 through 2004.4, and zero otherwise. 
d The Breusch-Godfrey statistic has a Chi-square distribution with n degree of freedom, where n 
is the order of autocorrelation under the alternative hypothesis. The critical value at five percent 
significance level is in parentheses. 
e n.a. = not applicable
   25 
Table 5. Selected Demand Elasticities at the Sample Mean 
Variables  Fluid milk    Cheese 
  Estimate  Stand. Err.    Estimate  Stand. Err. 
Regime dependent parameter           
Generic goodwill            
Regime 1  0.06  0.01    1.33  0.26 
Regime 2  0.08  0.01    0.62  0.16 
Regime 3  0.06  0.01    0.03  0.01 
Regime 4  0.04  0.01    0.01  0.01 
Regime independent parameters         
Normalized own price  –0.20  0.03    –0.15  0.08 
Normalized income  0.45  0.06    0.20  0.08 
Branded goodwill  n.a.  n.a.    0.03  0.01 
Percentage under age six  0.20  0.05    n.a.  n.a. 
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Figure 2. Regime classification of deflated generic cheese advertising expenditures (2004 







































































































































































Figure 4. Generic cheese advertising elasticities at different levels of intensity 


















































Figure 5. Benefit – cost ratio for generic fluid milk advertising 
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